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INTRODUCTION
John Navarrete sued Hill’s Pet Nutrition, a dog food manufacturer, after
it voluntarily recalled some of its products for containing too much vitamin
D.1 The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation centralized2 Navarrete’s
case with five other cases pursuant to the multidistrict litigation statute, 28
U.S.C. § 1407.3 All six plaintiffs claimed that their pets died or became
seriously ill because they consumed the recalled products.4 The centralized
proceeding is currently pending in the District of Kansas, where all pretrial
matters will be resolved.5
A few states to the West, Bradley Colgate, along with forty-four
individuals from twenty-two different states, sued JUUL Labs, a leader in the
electronic cigarette industry.6 The plaintiffs alleged that JUUL used research
from the tobacco industry to create a product that is more addictive than
traditional cigarettes and targeted at youth.7 The Panel centralized Colgate’s
case with nine other multiparty cases, all involving claims that JUUL
marketed its products to attract minors, misrepresented or omitted that its
products are more potent and addictive than traditional cigarettes, and
promoted nicotine addiction.8 There may be more than forty additional
related actions.9 The centralized proceeding is currently pending in the
Northern District of California.10
Moving to the East Coast, more than 14,000 plaintiffs sued manufacturers
of products containing asbestos in eighty-seven federal districts, alleging
personal injury or wrongful death caused by asbestos exposure.11 The
litigation involved thousands of deaths, millions of injuries, and billions of
dollars.12 The Panel centralized 26,639 actions, all involving questions of the
danger attributable to airborne asbestos in industrial materials and products.13

1 Navarrete v. Hill’s Pet Nutrition, Inc., No. C 19-00767, 2019 WL 1932388, at *1 (N.D. Cal.
May 1, 2019).
2 “Centralization” refers to the process of transferring civil cases pending in different federal
districts that involve one or more common questions of fact to one federal district for coordinated
pretrial proceedings. See Overview of Panel, U.S. JUD. PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIG.,
https://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/overview-panel-0 [https://perma.cc/EFM7-B4DS].
3 In re Hill’s Pet Nutrition, Inc., 382 F. Supp. 3d 1350, 1350-51 (J.P.M.L. 2019).
4 Id. at 1351 & n.2.
5 Id. at 1351.
6 Colgate v. JUUL Labs, Inc., 402 F. Supp. 3d 728, 736 (N.D. Cal. 2019).
7 Id.
8 In re Juul Labs, Inc., 396 F. Supp. 3d 1366, 1367 (J.P.M.L. 2019).
9 Id.
10 Id. at 1368.
11 In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 771 F. Supp. 415, 416 (J.P.M.L. 1991).
12 Id. at 418.
13 Id. at 416.
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The centralized proceeding is currently pending in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania—and has been since 1991.14
These three cases vary greatly, and not just in their subject matter. One
involves a handful of plaintiffs, while another involves tens of thousands. One
involves lawsuits originating in 2019, while another includes lawsuits that are
thirty years old. These examples illustrate the enormous diversity of cases
centralized in MDLs across the country. Because of this diversity, there is no
uniform set of federal rules governing MDL proceedings. Instead, MDL
judges craft procedure specifically suited for the particular case before them,15
guided by the knowledge shared by the Panel on its website, the Manual for
Complex Litigation, and the experience of seasoned MDL attorneys.16 But
this could soon change.
In November 2017, the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules first addressed
the possibility of creating new rules specifically for MDL.17 The corporate
defense bar, most notably Lawyers for Civil Justice, had been urging the
Committee for years to adopt MDL-specific rules, arguing that ad hoc
procedures lack transparency, uniformity, and predictability, and are unfair to
defendants.18 At its next meeting, the Committee appointed a Subcommittee
to study the need for MDL-specific rules.19 Since then, the Subcommittee
has gathered more information and reached out to active players in MDL
Id. at 424.
Creative procedures deployed by judges in MDLs include the use of plaintiff and defendant
fact sheets and Lone Pine orders; case groupings; consolidated complaints and motions sequencing;
and coordination with parallel state court cases. See generally CATHERINE R. BORDEN, FED. JUD.
CTR., MANAGING RELATED PROPOSED CLASS ACTIONS IN MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION (2018),
https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/materials/21/Managing_Related_Proposed_Class_Actions_in_
Multidistrict_Litigation.pdf [https://perma.cc/6ZS4-U6YJ] (identifying successful judicial strategies
for handling multiple overlapping or conflicting class actions in multidistrict litigation proceedings);
U.S. JUD. PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIG. & FED. JUD. CTR., TEN STEPS TO BETTER CASE
MANAGEMENT: A GUIDE FOR MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION TRANSFEREE JUDGES (2d ed. 2014),
https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2014/Ten-Steps-MDL-Judges-2D.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ER7N-K4W9] [hereinafter TEN STEPS TO BETTER CASE MANAGEMENT].
16 See U.S. JUD. PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIG., https://www.jpml.uscourts.gov
[https://perma.cc/J74B-H35W] (providing links to rules and procedures governing multidistrict
litigation); MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 22 (2004) (discussing categories of
information helpful to judges managing mass tort suits).
17 A DVISORY C OMM. ON C IV. R ULES, JUD. C ONF. OF THE U.S., A GENDA: M EETING OF
THE
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES, 469-76 (Nov. 7, 2017),
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2017-11-CivilRulesAgendaBook_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KY2H-WZUN] [hereinafter NOVEMBER 2017 MEETING].
18 Reform MDLs, LAWS. FOR CIV. JUST., https://www.lfcj.com/rules-for-mdls.html
[https://perma.cc/BMV3-4EXM].
19 ADVISORY COMM. ON CIV. RULES, JUD. CONF. OF THE U.S., AGENDA: MEETING OF THE
ADVISORY
COMMITTEE
ON
CIVIL
RULES
93
(Apr.
10,
2018),
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2018-04-civil-rules-agenda-book.pdf [https://perma.cc/MW94VEJF] [hereinafter APRIL 2018 MEETING].
14
15
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proceedings. At its meeting in October 2019, it identified four topics as the
center of its current work: early vetting to weed out meritless claims,
opportunities for interlocutory appellate review, settlement review, and thirdparty litigation funding disclosure.20 In April 2020, the Subcommittee
narrowed its focus to the first three.21 And in October 2020, the
Subcommittee made significant progress: it decided not to pursue rulemaking
for expanded interlocutory appellate review, but it is still studying potential
rules for screening claims and judicial supervision of settlement.22
Although some of these topics are more appropriate for rulemaking than
others, this Comment argues that the Subcommittee should decline to move
forward with any rule proposal. This Comment first provides an overview of
MDL in Part I. It explains the basic structure of § 1407 and the mechanics of
transfer. Next, Part I offers a brief history of § 1407, starting with the
considerations that prompted its passage in the first place. This history tells
an important story about the reason for MDL’s flexible design. The drafters
of § 1407 wanted to give federal judges flexibility to handle increasingly
complex litigation. They crafted § 1407 to be free from rigid, formulaic
procedural requirements—despite backlash from the corporate defense bar
that closely mirrors the language used to advocate for MDL-specific rules
today.23 Part I then describes recent MDL practice: its rise in popularity
following more restrictive judicial attitudes toward Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, and the makeup of MDLs currently pending in
federal district courts. Part I concludes by addressing the progress the Rules
Committee has made since deciding to consider proposals for MDL-specific
rules in 2017, current through its October 2020 meeting.
Part II of this Comment examines the advantages and disadvantages of
MDL rulemaking. It frames the discussion in terms of the two aims of the

A DVISORY C OMM . ON C IV . R ULES , J UD . C ONF . OF THE U.S.,
THE A DVISORY C OMMITTEE ON C IVIL R ULES 102-03

A GENDA : M EETING
(Oct. 29, 2019),
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2019-10_civil_rules_agenda_book.pdf
[https://perma.cc/86VJ-P4X5] [hereinafter O CTOBER 2019 M EETING ].
21 A DVISORY C OMM . ON C IV . R ULES , J UD . C ONF . OF THE U.S., A GENDA : M EETING
OF THE A DVISORY C OMMITTEE ON C IVIL R ULES 26-27 (Apr. 1, 2020),
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/04-2020_civil_rules_agenda_book.pdf
[https://perma.cc/P7PA-V789] [hereinafter A PRIL 2020 M EETING ].
22
A DVISORY C OMM . ON C IV . R ULES , J UD . C ONF . OF THE U.S., A GENDA : M EETING
OF THE A DVISORY C OMMITTEE ON C IVIL R ULES 151 (Oct. 16, 2020),
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2020-10_civil_rules_agenda_book_final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/97QQ-W5EV] [hereinafter O CTOBER 2020 M EETING ].
23 See Andrew D. Bradt, A
‘ Radical Proposal’: The Multidistrict Litigation Act of 1968, 165 U. PA.
L. REV. 831, 831–32 (2017) (discussing how those who developed MDL were anything but modest,
and developed it as a mechanism “to centralize power over nationwide litigation in the hands of
individual judges committed to the principles of active case management”).
20

OF
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Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: efficiency and fairness.24 Part II also discusses
other considerations that must be weighed in deciding whether to adopt MDLspecific rules, including precautions already in place to limit bias from ad hoc
procedure and the significant variation between small and large MDLs.
Part III of this Comment focuses on the four proposals the Subcommittee
has decided to study: early vetting, opportunities for interlocutory appellate
review, settlement review, and third-party litigation funding disclosure.
Rather than providing an exhaustive description of these proposals, Part III
uses them as a vehicle for examining the appropriateness of the MDLrulemaking enterprise as a whole. It argues that balancing the costs and
benefits of these four proposals reveals that MDL-specific rules will not
promote efficiency and fairness and should not be adopted.
Finally, Part IV concludes with a discussion of alternatives to federal
rulemaking, including action by Congress, an MDL working group,
amending the current rules, and education. Although these alternatives each
have their costs, many are better suited for the MDL context than
promulgating an entirely new set of rules. More importantly, most current
literature fails to consider possibilities for MDL reform beyond federal
rulemaking, and this Comment hopes to encourage scholars and others
invested in MDL procedure to expand the conversation outside the four
corners of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
I. OVERVIEW OF MDL
The multidistrict litigation statute provides that “civil actions involving
one or more common questions of fact . . . pending in different
districts . . . may be transferred to any district for coordinated or
consolidated pretrial proceedings.”25 The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation, comprised of seven federal judges appointed by the Chief Justice
of the United States, decides whether transfer “will promote the just and
efficient conduct of such actions,” and orders transfer if it so concludes.26 The
Panel may only transfer cases for pretrial purposes: it may not transfer cases
for consolidated trial.27 Pretrial matters range from deciding class
24 See FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (“[These rules] should be construed, administered, and employed by
the court and the parties to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action
and proceeding.”).
25 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a).
26 Id.
27 See id. (“[S]uch actions may be transferred to any district for coordinated or consolidated
pretrial proceedings.”); see also Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S.
26, 40 (1998) (foreclosing self-transfer of MDLs for trial by the transferee judge). But see Chair of
Judicial Panel Sees Role as Gatekeeper, THIRD BRANCH, (U.S. Cts., Wash., D.C.) Nov. 2005 at 1, 3
(“We’re hopeful that in this Congress . . . Lexecon will be a thing of the past.”).
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certification motions and motions to dismiss to resolving discovery disputes
and managing expert disclosures.28 After pretrial proceedings are finished,
the action “shall be remanded by the panel . . . to the district from which it
was transferred.”29 Even with this limitation, the effects of pretrial transfer
are significant. Only about three percent of cases return to the transferor
court—the rest are settled or resolved by dispositive motion in the MDL
court.30 Because trials are rare, pretrial proceedings are the “main event”—
and these pretrial proceedings are squarely within the purview of the MDL
judge.31
The Panel may transfer an MDL proceeding to any district, even if venue
and personal jurisdiction requirements would ordinarily foreclose that forum to
the parties.32 Transfer may be initiated by the Panel upon its own initiative, or
upon motion “filed with the panel by a party in any action in which
transfer . . . may be appropriate.”33 If a party opposes transfer, it may petition for
an extraordinary writ in the court of appeals with jurisdiction over the transferee
district court.34 In contrast, an order denying transfer is not reviewable.35
Like all civil actions in federal court, MDLs are governed by the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.36 Although the Panel may prescribe rules for its

TEN STEPS TO BETTER CASE MANAGEMENT, supra note 15, at 3.
28 U.S.C. § 1407(a).
See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Remanding Multidistrict Litigation, 75 LA. L. REV. 399-401
(2014) (“Multidistrict litigation has frequently been described as a ‘black hole’ because transfer is
typically a one-way ticket.” (footnote omitted)); see also Abbe R. Gluck, Unorthodox Civil Procedure:
Modern Multidistrict Litigation’s Place in the Textbook Understandings of Procedure, 165 U. PA. L. REV.
1669, 1673 (2017) (“Although styled as a mechanism for only pretrial resolution of cases unamenable
to class action but with sufficient similarities to justify some consolidation, it is the worst-kept secret
in civil procedure that the MDL is really a dispositive, not pretrial, action.” (footnote omitted)).
31 See Bradt, supra note 23, at 834-35 (“[T]he vast majority of transferred cases are terminated
or settled before pretrial proceedings conclude, that is, while they are within the control of the MDL
judge. In a world where trials are exceedingly rare, pretrial proceedings are the main event.”
(footnote omitted)); see also Marc Galanter & Angela M. Frozena, A Grin Without A Cat: The
Continuing Decline & Displacement of Trials in American Courts, DAEDALUS, Summer 2014, at 115, 121
(“[T]he decline [in trials] has become institutionalized in the practices and expectations of judges,
administrators, lawyers, and parties.”).
32 See, e.g., In re Aircraft Accident, 474 F. Supp. 996, 999 (J.P.M.L. 1979) (“The Panel’s
discretion under Section 1407 is not limited by venue considerations . . . and the fact that defendants
may not all be amenable to suit in the same jurisdiction does not prevent transfer to a single district
for pretrial proceedings where the prerequisites of Section 1407 are otherwise satisfied.”). For an
analysis of the role of personal jurisdiction in MDL, see Andrew D. Bradt, The Long Arm of
Multidistrict Litigation, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1165 (2018).
33 28 U.S.C. § 1407(c)(i-ii).
34 Id. § 1407(e).
35 Id.
36 Id. § 1407(f); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (“These rules govern the procedure in all civil actions
and proceedings in the United States district courts . . . .” (emphasis added)).
28
29
30
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operations (and has done so twenty-five times37), these rules must be
consistent with the Civil Rules.38 Because MDL requires a higher degree of
practical problem solving than “traditional” two-party civil litigation, MDL
judges are emboldened to develop special MDL procedures that vary from
case to case.39
This Section begins with a brief history of § 1407, focusing in particular
on the considerations that prompted its creators to delegate authority to the
Panel instead of promulgating a firm set of rules. It then discusses recent
trends in MDL practice and the overlap between MDL and its complex
litigation cousin, the class action. This section concludes with a description
of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rule’s progress through its October 2020
Subcommittee meeting.
A. A Brief History
A small group of judges, aided by scholar Phil C. Neil, invented the MDL
statute in the early 1960s, predicting a “litigation explosion” as a result of the
increased prevalence of mass torts.40 A flood of antitrust litigation brought
against electrical equipment manufacturers beginning in 1961 likely inspired
the prediction.41 The complaints alleged conspiracies to divide business and
fix prices among virtually every American manufacturer of electrical
equipment, culminating in over 1,800 cases in thirty-five federal district
courts during a twelve-month period.42 The judges and scholar behind the
creation of the MDL statute believed that control over these cases ought not
remain in the hands of the parties or their attorneys—or even in the hands of
ordinary federal judges.43 Instead, they recognized a need for more efficient
management of complex, multiparty, multidistrict litigation.

37 R ULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE U NITED STATES JUDICIAL PANEL ON
MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION, U.S. JUD. PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIG. (2016). For a
summary of these rules, see Summary of Panel Rules, U.S. CTS. (Oct. 4, 2010),
https://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/sites/jpml/files/Summary%20of%20Panel%20Rules_Revised_10
-4-2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZUW9-4CYX].
38 28 U.S.C. § 1407(f).
39 See Gluck, supra note 30, at 1673-74 (“MDLs exemplify procedural exceptionalism. This is a
type of litigation that judges insist is unique, too different from case to case to be managed by the
transsubstantive values that form the very soul of the FRCP. Instead, judges develop their own
special MDL procedures . . . .”).
40 Bradt, supra note 23, at 834; see also Bradt, supra note 32, at 1199 (noting that MDL “was
invented by an academic, Dean Phil C. Neal of the University of Chicago, and United States District
Judge William H. Becker of the Western District of Missouri”).
41 See generally Phil C. Neal & Perry Goldberg, The Electrical Equipment Antitrust Cases: Novel
Judicial Administration, 50 A.B.A. J. 621 (1964).
42 Bradt, supra note 23, at 855.
43 Id. at 855–56.
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In 1962, Chief Justice Warren assembled a Subcommittee of the
Committee on Pretrial Procedure to consider the problems “arising from
discovery procedures in multiple litigation filed in different judicial districts
but with common witnesses and exhibits.”44 Eventually, the Subcommittee
decided to centralize pretrial proceedings with later remand for trial. This
system enabled judges to flexibly and innovatively manage complex litigation,
while still allowing plaintiffs’ lawyers to meaningfully control their cases.45
Although the Subcommittee had no express authority to require judges to
take specific actions, it managed to convince many judges to adopt a
coordinated approach to case management.46
The Subcommittee’s success managing the electrical equipment cases led
to requests that it also shepherd other litigation surges.47 In addition, it
prompted a proposal that Congress create a more permanent body to perform
this task.48 In 1968, Congress passed 28 U.S.C. § 1407, and the Panel assumed
the Subcommittee’s role as centralizer.
B. Use of the MDL Statute Today
For most of its history, attorneys, judges, and even scholars treated the
MDL statute as a “little-utilized and disfavored judicial backwater,”
preferring the class action for managing complex litigation, particularly in
large products-liability cases.49 Indeed, before 1990 the Panel centralized only
six products-liability MDL proceedings.50 But things have changed.
As of July 2020, MDLs account for 130,649 pending cases in federal district
court.51 That means that MDLs comprise more than one-third of the
Id. (quoting Press Release, Admin. Off. of the U.S. Cts. 1-2 (Feb. 7, 1962)).
Id. at 839 (“Such a ‘limited transfer’ structure would insulate the statute from . . . the resistance
of plaintiffs’ lawyers who might fear loss of control over their cases . . . . The transfer structure might
also, however, create the necessary central control for a single judge to manage the litigation.”).
46 ADVISORY COMM. ON CIV. RULES, JUD. CONF. OF THE U.S., AGENDA: MEETING OF
THE
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES
140-41
(Nov.
1,
2018),
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2018-11_civil_rules_agenda_book_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/34N9-237L] [hereinafter NOVEMBER 2018 MEETING].
47 Id. at 141.
48 Id.
49 Linda S. Mullenix, Aggregate Litigation and the Death of Democratic Dispute Resolution, 107 Nw.
U. L. Rev. 511, 552 (2013); see also Bradt, supra note 23, at 832 (“As recently as a decade ago, it would
have been reasonable to say that multidistrict litigation . . . was a second banana to the class
action . . . .”); Gluck, supra note 30, at 1671 (describing MDL as “the quieter sibling of class actions”).
50 Thomas E. Willging & Emery G. Lee III, From Class Actions to Multidistrict Consolidations:
Aggregate Mass-Tort Litigation After Ortiz, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 775, 793 (2010).
51 U.S. JUD. PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIG., MDL STATISTICS REPORT –
DISTRIBUTION OF PENDING MDL DOCKETS BY ACTIONS PENDING 3 (2020),
https://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/sites/jpml/files/Pending_MDL_Dockets_By_Actions_PendingJuly-16-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/4HWQ-FXHM].
44
45
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approximately 340,000 pending civil cases in federal courts.52 The roughly
120,000 cases pending in MDLs have been centralized into 227 actions, and
the largest action contains over 20,000 cases.53 It is important to recognize,
however, that the large number of MDL cases in recent years “has been
principally due to there being, at any given time, about two dozen MDLs with
1,000 or more cases.”54 Although these cases, which are typically categorized
as products-liability litigation, tend to occupy public attention, they are not
representative of MDL as a whole.55 Overall, the number of MDL dockets has
declined by about fifty percent since 2009.56 Nevertheless, MDL continues to
play a significant role in the current civil litigation landscape.
One explanation for the changing perception of MDL as a tool for
resolving mass litigation is changing judicial attitudes toward class
certification under Rule 23.57 Rule 23(f) and the Class Action Fairness Act
have changed the procedural landscape, and “[n]umerous courts have become
skeptical about certifying class actions.”58 Although MDL centralization is
“not exactly an alternative to class action aggregation of claims,”59 it is often
used to accomplish essentially the same purpose.60 This centralization has
many advantages. The MDL process confers benefits on plaintiffs,
defendants, and even judges. Plaintiffs can band together and combine
resources to achieve parity with well-resourced defendants, while defendants
appreciate the value of global peace—the opportunity “to litigate all claims
in a single forum where they can both efficiently perform discovery and
motion practice and eventually achieve peace, whether through victory on a
52 Letter from Zachary D. Clopton, Assoc. Professor of L., Cornell L. Sch., to Members of
the Subcomm. on Multidistrict Litig. 2 (Oct. 26, 2018), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/18-cvy-suggestion_clopton_re_mdl_rulemaking_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/WQ8H-2THY].
53 Id. at 1.
54 ADVISORY COMM. ON CIV. RULES, JUD. CONF. OF THE U.S., AGENDA: MEETING OF
THE
ADVISORY
COMMITTEE
ON
CIVIL
RULES
207
(Apr.
2-3,
2019),
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2019-04_civil_rules_agenda_book.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7S9C-9LB5] [hereinafter APRIL 2019 MEETING].
55 Letter from Zachary D. Clopton, supra note 52, at 2.
56 APRIL 2019 MEETING, supra note 54, at 207.
57 See Panel Promotes Just and Efficient Conduct of Litigation, THIRD BRANCH (U.S. Cts., Wash.,
D.C.) Feb. 2010, at 3 (“The advent of the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) and evolving judicial
views of class certification under Rule 23 have coincided to make centralization under Section 1407
an often attractive alternative for resolving complex aggregated claims.”).
58 Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 729, 731-32 (2013); see
also Willging & Lee, supra note 50, at 784 (“Rule 23(f) has almost certainly contributed to the
restriction in class action certification during the past decade.”); Linda S. Mullenix, Dubious
Doctrines: The Quasi-Class Action, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 389, 390 (2011) (“Because the formal class
action rule became an inconvenient impediment to resolving aggregate claims favorably to both
plaintiff and defense interests, actors involved in mass litigation now promote MDL
procedure . . . as an entirely useful, creative legal fiction to accomplish self-interested goals.”).
59 Willging & Lee, supra note 50, at 794.
60 Bradt, supra note 23, at 835.
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dispositive motion or through settlement.”61 Judges, and the judicial system
more generally, benefit from the docket-clearing and efficiency gains
centralization provides, as well as from the flexibility to manage complex and
novel issues using different procedures and management techniques.62
Despite its utility, MDL also presents unique challenges to judges and
litigants. One judge described managing MDLs as “like Rule 16 on Steroids.
In the MDL, you need to strategize more. You have to look beyond
immediate deadlines and see how all the pieces fit together.”63 Scholars have
also expressed concern about the lack of procedural protections for plaintiffs
in MDL proceedings, including the lack of an opt-out option or judicial
review of settlement fairness.64 In light of the strong positions taken both for
and against MDL proceedings, it is unsurprising that the Rules Committee
has now determined to examine them more closely.
C. Rules Committee Progress
In November 2017, the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules first asked
“whether the time has come to undertake an effort to generate rules specifically
adapted to MDL proceedings.”65 There are many reasons the Committee may
have decided that nearly fifty years after Congress passed § 1407 it was time to
take up that question. Undoubtedly, the Committee was influenced by the
increasing popularity of the MDL statute for resolving mass torts.66 Pressure

61 Id. at 836; see also Burch, supra note 30, at 414 (“Centralization likewise advantages
defendants by making meaningful closure possible through a global settlement.”).
62 Bradt, supra note 23, at 836; see also An Interview with Judge John F. Nangle: Chair of the
Judicial
Panel
on
Multidistrict
Litigation,
T HIRD B RANCH
(Dec.
1995),
https://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/sites/jpml/files/The%20Third%20Branch%20-%20December1995-Nangle%20Interview.pdf [https://perma.cc/ D3VC-WVFP] (“[C]entralization eliminates
duplication of discovery; avoids inconsistent pretrial rulings; conserves the resources of the parties, their
counsel and the Judiciary; and thereby expedites the entire proceeding . . . . [T]he panel has, through
experience, developed a very solid corps of judges who are highly skilled in handling special types of
litigation.”).
63 Gluck, supra note 30, at 1688.
64 See, e.g., Mullenix, supra note 58, at 391 (“The deployment of MDL jurisdiction . . . has
stripped away protections afforded by class action requirements. Mass litigation actors may now
settle complex cases largely unconstrained by law.”); Martin H. Redish & Julie M. Karaba, One Size
Doesn’t Fit All: Multidistrict Litigation, Due Process, and the Dangers of Procedural Collectivism, 95 B.U.
L. REV. 109, 110 (2015) (“[T]he current practice of MDL actually makes the modern class action
appear to be the pinnacle of procedural due process by comparison.”).
65 NOVEMBER 2017 MEETING, supra note 17, at 477.
66 See Bradt, supra note 23, at 833 (“With the Supreme Court and lower courts cutting back the
viability of the class action under Rule 23 for decades and with Congress providing for expanded
jurisdiction over class actions in the federal courts, MDL has become the leading mechanism for
resolving mass torts.” (footnote omitted)).

2021]

The Case Against MDL Rulemaking

285

from the corporate bar, most notably from Lawyers for Civil Justice,67 also
likely played a role. The first proposals to the Committee for amending the
rules were made in November 2017 by Lawyers for Civil Justice, the
Washington Legal Foundation, and the Duke Center for Judicial Studies,
represented by John Rabiej.68 All three proposals reflected a concern that “[t]he
felt pressures of managing MDL proceedings, particularly in those that bring
together the largest numbers of cases, lead MDL judges to create imaginative
procedures only loosely anchored in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”69
Lawyers for Civil Justice and the Washington Legal Foundation expressed
concern that “[l]arge MDL proceedings attract many claimants whose
purported claims have no foundation in fact, and there is no effective means
for screening them out.”70 Lawyers for Civil Justice offered seven proposals:
(1) master complaints; (2) particularized pleading; (3) initial evidence; (4)
permissive joinder of plaintiffs; (5) required disclosures; (6) true consent for
bellwether trials; and (7) appellate review.71 The Washington Legal
Foundation supported the proposals by Lawyers for Civil Justice, offering
two papers emphasizing the potential for MDLs to become “warehouses for
meritless, unvetted claims that would be quickly dismissed if brought as
individualized actions.”72
The Duke Center for Judicial Studies offered a different perspective,
suggesting a new Rule 23.3 limited to MDL proceedings. The rule would
cover actions that include 900 or more individual cases, which account for
about ninety percent of all centralized cases.73 The proposal contends that
these mega-cases would be better handled if, “‘at some point after most
discovery takes place,’ and shortly after the bellwether cases have been
selected, the work is divided among five judges ‘to decide whether to dispose
of a case on motion, settle, or remand.’”74 Unlike the proposals recommended
by Lawyers for Civil Justice and the Washington Legal Foundation, the
Committee has not considered this proposal further.
In April 2018, the Committee appointed a Subcommittee to gather more
information on MDL and MDL-specific rules because, although “[v]aluable
information has been provided . . . it is mostly from one
67 Lawyers for Civil Justice describes itself as “a partnership of leading corporate counsel and
defense bar practitioners . . . forg[ing] alliances among its members and leverag[ing] the strength of those
alliances to help restore and maintain balance in the civil justice system.” About Us, LAWS. FOR CIV.
JUST., https://www.lfcj.com/about-us.html [https://perma.cc/LP9E-YSG7].
68 NOVEMBER 2017 MEETING, supra note 17, at 469-76, 535-37.
69 Id. at 469.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 469-74.
72 Id. at 475-76.
73 Id. at 476.
74 Id.
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perspective. . . . [T]he Committee needs more, particularly from the Judicial
Panel.”75 The Committee resolved to launch a six- to twelve-month project to
gather information to inform the decision of whether to generate new rules.76
It determined to seek information from the Panel,77 as well as from bar
groups, but did not commit to study any particular proposals.78 By November
2018, little progress had been made. The Committee had gathered more
information but was not yet prepared to make recommendations about
whether to consider possible rule amendments.79
In October 2019, the Committee reported that “[i]t had gathered a lot of
information,” but it “remains an open question whether it will be useful to
propose any MDL-specific rules.”80 One of the most notable features of this
meeting was an increase in the number of voices heard, particularly from
outside the corporate bar. In addition to proposals from Lawyers for Civil
Justice, the Subcommittee gathered research from the Federal Judicial Center
Research Division,81 as well as materials from Professor Zachary Clopton,82
John Beisner,83 Bracket Denniston and twenty-five other general counsels,84

APRIL 2018 MEETING, supra note 19, at 93.
Id.
The Panel “seem[ed] to have some understandable skepticism about whether rule changes
would materially improve MDL practice. Panel members . . . may be inclined to think that
distinctive aspects of different MDLs make some overarching set of new rules hard to imagine.” Id.
at 158.
78 Id. at 148-53.
79 See NOVEMBER 2018 MEETING, supra note 46, at 139-40 (“[The Subcommittee] continues
to gather information and has not yet attempted to develop recommendations about whether to
consider possible rule amendments, or what amendments, if any, should be given serious study.”).
80 OCTOBER 2019 MEETING, supra note 20, at 102.
81 Id. at 225. The Federal Judicial Center’s statutory mission is “to conduct and stimulate
research and development for the improvement of judicial administration.” MARGARET S.
WILLIAMS, EMERY G. LEE III & JASON A. CANTONE, FED. JUD. CTR., PLAINTIFF FACT SHEETS
IN MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION: PRODUCTS LIABILITY PROCEEDINGS 2008-2018 (2019).
82 See Letter from Zachary D. Clopton, supra note 52, at 1 (“The current proposals call for
specialized rules for a subset of federal cases, a departure from the norm that should not be made
lightly.”).
83 See Letter from John H. Beisner, Litig. Partner, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom
LLP, to Ms. Rebecca A. Womeldorf, Sec’y, Comm. on Rules of Prac. & Proc., Admin. Off. of
the U.S. Cts. (Nov. 21, 2018), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/18-cv-bbsuggestion_beisner_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/7PKD-SLHV] (responding to the proposed Rule
23.3, which would allow intermediate interlocutory appeal in some circumstances).
84 See Letter from Brackett B. Denniston, III, Former Senior Vice President and Gen. Couns.,
Gen. Elec. et al., to Ms. Rebecca A. Womeldorf, Sec’y, Comm. on Rules of Prac. & Proc., Admin.
Off. of the U.S. Cts. (Jan. 31, 2019), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/19-cv-hsuggestion_us_chamber_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/6986-ZAA5] (supporting the proposal to amend
Rule 26(a)(1)(A)).
75
76
77
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Eric Blinderman and two other representatives of litigation funders,85 and
Christopher Bogart of Burford, also a litigation funder.86
Also in October 2019, the Subcommittee identified four topics as the
center of current work: (1) early vetting of individual cases to weed out
meritless claims; (2) opportunities for interlocutory review; (3) settlement
review; and (4) third-party litigation funding.87 It also determined that
rulemaking proposals primarily concern the mega-MDLs that aggregate
thousands and tens of thousands of cases and elected to focus analysis on
these proceedings.88
In April 2020, the Subcommittee reported that its work is “ongoing.”89 It
continued to explore the four topics it identified as central at its October 2019
meeting, but it focused primarily on early vetting and interlocutory and
settlement review.90 To supplement its discussion, the Subcommittee
canvassed the use of census techniques in four major MDL proceedings.91 As
at its other meetings, the Subcommittee also outlined arguments in favor and
against the adoption of each MDL rule proposal, which are explored in detail
in Part III.
At its most recent meeting in October 2020, the Subcommittee
determined that rulemaking should not be pursued for providing expanded
interlocutory appellate review.92 It based its decision on (1) the potential for
significant delay if expanded appellate review is possible; (2) broad judicial
opposition to expanded appellate review; and (3) difficulties defining the
subset of MDL proceedings in which expanded appellate review should be
available, among other factors.93 The Subcommittee has not yet decided if
rulemaking should be pursued for screening claims or judicial supervision of
settlement.94 It is collecting more information on the effectiveness of “census”
techniques for identifying meritless claims and organizing MDL

85 See Letter from Eric H. Blinderman, Chief Exec. Officer, Therium Cap. Mgmt. et al., to
Ms. Rebecca A. Womeldorf, Sec’y, Comm. on Rules of Prac. & Proc., Admin. Off. of the U.S. Cts.
(Feb. 20, 2019), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/19-cv-e-suggestion_burford_capital
_et_al_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/7BMJ-9YK3] (opposing the proposal to amend Rule 26(a)(1)(A)).
86 See Letter from Christopher P. Bogart, Chief Exec. Officer, Burford Cap., to Ms. Rebecca
A. Womeldorf, Sec’y, Comm. on Rules of Prac. & Proc., Admin. Off. of the U.S. Cts. (Feb. 20,
2019) (on file with author) (rebutting the U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform’s claim that the
business community does not use litigation financing).
87 OCTOER 2019 MEETING, supra note 20, at 103–04.
88 See id. at 103 (“Drafting rules that distinguish the many smaller MDLs might prove difficult.”).
89 APRIL 2020 MEETING, supra note 21, at 145.
90 Id. at 145, 148, 154.
91 Id. at 147-48.
92 OCTOBER 2020 MEETING, supra note 22, at 151.
93 Id. at 156-57.
94
Id. at 151.
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proceedings, and on the experiences of leadership counsel in global
settlement negotiations.95
II. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF MDL RULEMAKING
The purpose of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is “to secure the just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.”96
Any amendments to these rules or attempts to create a new set of federal rules
ought to further this objective. This Part examines the advantages and
disadvantages of MDL-specific rules at a big-picture level. It frames the
discussion in terms of efficiency—aimed at achieving the “speedy” and
“inexpensive” goals of the Civil Rules—and fairness—aimed at achieving the
“just” goal of the Civil Rules. Part III provides a more focused examination
of the advantages and disadvantages of the four potential rule topics the
Subcommittee is most seriously considering.
In the context of federal rulemaking, “what the Advisory Committee on
Civil Rules does not do is, in some ways, as important as what it
does. . . . Amendments do not and should not happen often.”97 Changes to
procedure through rulemaking tend to be modest, but that does not make
them unimportant. The class action context provides a helpful example:
“[T]he repeated attempts to revise the class action rules, attempts that have
resulted in relatively marginal changes, have demonstrated the difficulty of
making massive changes through the rulemaking process.”98 It is likely that
any changes in the MDL context would be similar—evolutionary rather than
revolutionary. Nevertheless, even small changes can be significant.99

95

Id. at 152-53, 160.
FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
Richard Marcus, Shoes that Did Not Drop, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 637, 637 (2013).
Andrew D. Bradt, The Looming Battle for Control of Multidistrict Litigation in Historical
Perspective, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 87, 101 (2018); see also Richard Marcus, Revolution v. Evolution in
Class Action Reform, 96 N.C. L. REV. 903, 917 (2018) (“In terms of potentially revolutionary change,
the first two experiences with amending Rule 23 produced an evolution away from revolution that
has continued through the most recent episode.”).
99 See Bradt, supra note 98, at 99–100 (noting that the effects of the interlocutory appeal
provision for class certification in Rule 23(f), despite being the product of “evolutionary” rather than
“revolutionary” change, are “significant and important”).
96
97
98
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The complexity of rulemaking in the MDL context100 may compel
rulemakers to “shy away from [it] simply as a matter of prudence.”101 MDLs
come in a variety of shapes and sizes, and crafting transsubstantive rules that
work equally well in the largest and smallest MDLs would be difficult.102 One
of the reasons the drafters of the MDL statute chose to turn to Congress
instead of rulemaking in the 1960s was because of the difficulty and timeconsuming nature of the project.103 The difficulties identified in the 1960s
apply with equal force today. But even if rulemaking may be difficult and
time-consuming, it should be done if the changes will better serve the goals
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The arguments for and against MDL rulemaking can be framed in terms
of two litigation goals: efficiency and fairness. So far, “the battle lines are
drawn; well-funded corporate defense groups in favor of rules want to limit
discretion of MDL judges, while the plaintiffs’ bar and [the Panel] are
copacetic with the status quo.”104
The underlying arguments for amending the rules can also be grouped into
two categories: (1) “that MDL judges need to be constrained,” and (2) “that
MDL attracts meritless claims that are underexamined before being folded
into a global settlement.”105 Proponents of MDL-specific rules argue that
elevated judicial management will provide more efficient resolution of massive
and unwieldy proceedings.106 Pointing to data suggesting that “between 30-40
100 See NOVEMBER 2017 MEETING, supra note 17, at 477 (“A great deal of information must be
gathered to support useful rulemaking. The information includes the character of the common
elements of MDL proceedings and of the disparate elements that affect some number—perhaps
most—of them. The necessary information also includes the range of practices that have emerged
and the contexts in which they have emerged.”).
As Professor Clopton explained,

Looking at the full set of 227 MDLs, fewer than one third are products-liability cases.
The next largest categories are antitrust and sales practice litigation, with the
remaining cases including contract, disasters, employment, intellectual property, and
securities. The smallest MDLs are sometimes products-liability litigation. But they
also often involve cases sounding in antitrust, data security, intellectual property,
marketing and sales practice, and securities law.
Letter from Zachary D. Clopton, supra note 52, at 2.
101 Bradt, supra note 98, at 101.
102 Just in product-liability MDL proceedings, the FJC found that the number of cases ranged
from three to over 40,000. APRIL 2019 MEETING, supra note 54, at 210.
103 See Bradt, supra note 98, at 101 (“Indeed, one of the main reasons why Judge Murrah and
Judge Becker, at Judge Maris’s encouragement, backed away from rulemaking for MDL in the 1960s
was the potential difficulty and time-consuming nature of the project.”).
104 Id. at 99.
105 Id. at 98.
106 Letter from Zachary D. Clopton, supra note 52, at 3. But although “[t]his might be true for
the large MDLs . . . it does not seem particularly persuasive for the scores of MDLs comprising a
handful of consolidated cases.” Id.

290

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 169: 275

percent of all filed MDL cases turn out (often at the settlement stage) to be
unsupportable,” they argue that the lack of rules for MDL forces courts, and
defendants, to waste time and resources on meritless claims.107
A. Efficiency
The MDL statute was born from a desire to foster more efficient
resolution of complex cases. Congress recognized that “[t]he main purpose of
transfer for consolidation or coordination of pretrial proceedings is to
promote the ends of efficient justice . . . .”108 The drafters of the MDL statute
believed that “MDLs would come in many shapes and sizes, and [that] judges
would need flexibility in order to manage them.”109 They feared that strict
rules could interfere with the need to “adapt to changing circumstances, new
laws, and different kinds of litigation.”110 In order to preserve judicial
flexibility and independence, the drafters of the MDL statute attempted to
avoid rulemaking and kept the locus of control with the Panel.111 Civil Rules
for MDL proceedings would put this design at risk, potentially threatening
the basic features of MDL.112
Litigation has only become more complex in the fifty years since § 1407
was passed. The increase in MDL proceedings, and in their complexity, is a
reason to retain flexibility rather than “freeze procedure” through a set of
specific new rules.113 MDL increases litigation efficiency in many ways: it
allows related multidistrict claims to be handled, even if not tried, in a single
district; reduces duplicative discovery; and permits resource pooling. These
benefits cut both ways: plaintiffs benefit from pooling resources, placing them
on a more level playing field with well-resourced defendants, while
defendants benefit from centralized discovery and the prospect of global
peace if all claims can be settled jointly.
It is not apparent that adding MDL-specific rules will promote judicial
efficiency. The Panel has expressed “skepticism about whether rule changes
would materially improve MDL practice”—that is, whether rule changes
would make MDL more efficient.114 It reported that “[p]anel members are
open to work on shared concerns, but may be inclined to think that distinctive
107 J. Maxwell Heckendorn & Steven E. Swaney, Meritless Claims Create Inefficiencies in Multidistrict
Litigation, NAT’L L. REV. (Feb. 12, 2019), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/meritless-claimscreate-inefficiencies-multidistrict-litigation [https://perma.cc/8MJR-VK8Y].
108 S. REP. NO. 90-454, at 2 (1967).
109 Bradt, supra note 98, at 103.
110 Id.
111 Id. at 90-91.
112 Id. at 91.
113 Id. at 104.
114 APRIL 2018 MEETING, supra note 19, at 158.
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aspects of different MDLs make some overarching set of new rules hard to
imagine.”115 Many judges insist that MDL “is unique, too different from case
to case to be managed by the transsubstantive values that form the very soul
of the FRCP.”116 In a series of interviews conducted by Abbe Gluck, every
judge asked about the proposals to create MDL-specific rules opposed the
idea.117 The judges insisted that each MDL is different, and “that the very
hallmark of the MDL is the ability to deviate from traditional procedures—
i.e., for the judge to remain flexible and creative in every case.”118 The judges
also emphasized that MDL procedure is constantly changing and still a work
in progress—and one that may never be complete. As a result, best practices
are continually evolving, and what works well now may not work well five or
ten years from now. One judge noted that he “see[s] ways to change course
each time, new ways to tweak [MDL procedure]. . . . If we [crafted rules] too
early people would just go around them. . . . Every case is different.”119
The plaintiffs’ bar has expressed similar concerns. It questions whether a
one-size-fits all approach makes sense for MDL, which is intrinsically casespecific.120 It also argues that “[j]udges need to remain empowered to exercise
broad discretion in any particular case rather than be constrained by formalistic
preconceptions of what a vocal minority consider to be ‘best practices.’”121

Id.
Gluck, supra note 30, at 1674.
Id. at 1675. Gluck conducted lengthy and confidential oral interviews of twenty judges—
fifteen federal and five state—each with significant experience in MDL litigation. Id. She
interviewed each judge in person or over the phone for approximately one hour. Id.
Gluck asked the judges
115
116
117

why they think MDLs are on the rise; how MDLs compare to class actions; how MDL
procedure is made; about the relationship between MDL procedure and FRCP 16;
whether a separate rule for MDLs would be a positive development or whether Rule
23 could be expanded to include MDLs or make them less necessary; about
relationships among judges and attorneys in MDLs; about federalism and choice of
law; about relationships and coordination among federal judges and between federal
and state judges; about concerns regarding access to justice, transparency, the
individual case, and lack of judicial review; how MDLs differ from non-MDL cases;
about the role of consent; why they think MDLs are increasing; how they learned how
to conduct an MDL; about the MDL panel and its process; about requiring statecourt attorneys in parallel actions to pay into the common benefit fund; and about the
low remand rate.
Id.
118
119
120
121

Id. at 1689.
Id.
APRIL 2018 MEETING, supra note 19, at 205.
Id.
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B. Fairness
One of the driving forces behind proposals to amend the Civil Rules is
perceived unfairness to defendants created by uncertainties in MDL
procedure.122 Lawyers for Civil Justice argues that current MDL processes
lack transparency, uniformity, and predictability, resulting in an unbalanced
litigation environment.123 The organization has expressed concern that “[i]n
practice . . . the sheer number of cases filed in MDLs means that defendants
often cannot exercise their discovery rights until the litigation is well
underway, at which point defendants (and courts) must expend significant
resources to identify and combat these claims.”124
Scholars worry that MDL also results in unfairness to plaintiffs. Many of
their concerns echo the defense side: that MDL lacks transparency, and that the
absence of strict rules stunts the development of uniform procedural law.125 In
addition, they worry about the loss of the individual claim, and that MDL is just
“another mechanism that undermines trial and the traditional class action.”126
It is true that in the MDL context plaintiffs often exercise less control
over their cases than they would if the cases were being litigated
independently. For one, there is the risk of settlement pressure: “An MDL
judge will often lock transferred cases into the MDL forum in order to
pressure settlements. When this happens and the MDL aggregation is very
large, the personal control exerted by any individual plaintiff is weak.”127 This
threat is made all the more troubling by the potential for MDL settlements
to benefit the attorneys more than the injured claimants.128 Without the

122 See, e.g., LAWS. FOR CIV. JUST., MDL PRACTICES AND THE NEED FOR FRCP AMENDMENTS:
PROPOSALS FOR DISCUSSION WITH THE MDL/TPLF SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE ADVISORY
COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 2 (2018), https://www.lfcj.com/uploads/1/1/2/0/112061707/lcj_memo__mdl__tplf_proposals_for_discussion_9-14-18__004_.pdf [https://perma.cc/6WN8-9N53] (“The
asymmetric nature of MDLs encourages plaintiffs to file low- or no-merit cases against defendants,
because the marginal costs of adding a new case are close to zero, while the costs of uncovering
information about a claim’s lack of merit can be significant.”).
123 Id. at 1.
124 Id.
125 Gluck, supra note 30, at 1674.
126 Id.
127 Robert G. Bone, Making Effective Rules: The Need for Procedure Theory, 61 OKLA. L. REV.
319, 339-40 (2008); see also id. at 339 n.76 (“The threat of long delays and high delay costs in the
MDL forum often pressures plaintiffs to settle when they would prefer to have their cases
transferred back to their home forums for trial.”).
128 See D. Theodore Rave, Closure Provisions in MDL Settlements, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2175,
2177 (2017) (“The risk that MDL settlements can include terms that benefit the negotiating parties
more than claimants is well recognized. . . . [C]laimants who are sucked into an MDL have little
actual control over the litigation; lawyers on the PSC [plaintiffs’ steering committee] make the
important decisions.”); see also Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Monopolies in Multidistrict Litigation, 70
VAND. L. REV. 67, 70 (2017) (“If leadership’s influence is unchecked, it’s possible that lead attorneys
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protections of class certification, “multidistrict proceedings lack the judicial,
competitive-market, and institutional checks that can help safeguard and
legitimize class outcomes.”129 And unlike in class actions, where Rule 23
requires judges to ensure that settlements are “fair, reasonable, and
adequate,”130 judges have little say in the settlement reached by MDL lawyers,
who are often repeat players with the knowledge and experience to game the
system for their own personal benefit.131
Others view MDL as, on the whole, benefitting plaintiffs.132 Although a
lack of MDL rules may result in fewer procedural protections than available
in the class action,133 it can also increase access to the courts. Some judges
have reported that without MDL, “the courthouses would be closed to the
majority of cases that currently are consolidated.”134 One judge explained that
“the only way we can ensure people can get lawyers is to most efficiently
manage the cases. When I look at the MDL, I see more people getting some
redress than it would be if it had to be litigated fully.”135 Another stated that
MDL is “not about closing the courthouse doors at all . . . . [The cases] never
would have been able to be litigated on their own, especially for mass torts.”136
In addition to concerns about fairness and predictability, there is also
some concern that adopting special procedures for MDLs will create a new
brand of forum shopping. MDL-specific rules favorable to plaintiffs (or their
attorneys) might encourage plaintiffs to file their cases in separate districts,
hoping that the Panel will centralize them into an MDL and apply the
favorable rules.137 Alternatively, MDL-specific rules favorable to defendants
might encourage them to seek consolidation in order to obtain those benefits,
instead of to further the goals of MDL: convenience, justice, and efficiency.

could secure generous common-benefit fees for themselves, while generating suboptimal outcomes
for some or all claimants.”).
129 Burch, supra note 128, at 70-71.
130 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2).
131 Burch, supra note 128, at 71.
132 See, e.g., Gluck, supra note 30, at 1676 (describing how MDL opens the courthouse doors
when they otherwise would be closed); Andrew D. Bradt & D. Theodore Rave, It’s Good to Have the
‘Haves’ on Your Side: A Defense of Repeat Players in Multidistrict Litigation, 108 GEO. L.J 73, 101-03
(“MDL allows plaintiffs to capture some of the advantages of repeat play without triggering the
doctrinal tripwires of the class action.”).
133 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e) (“The claims, issues, or defenses of a certified class . . . may
be settled, voluntarily dismissed, or compromised only with the court’s approval. . . . [T]he court may
approve [a settlement proposal] only after a hearing and only on finding that it is fair, reasonable,
and adequate . . . .” (emphasis added)).
134 Gluck, supra note 30, at 1676.
135 Id. at 1696–97.
136 Id. at 1697.
137 Letter from Zachary D. Clopton, supra note 52, at 4.
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C. Other Considerations
Beyond efficiency and fairness, there are additional considerations that
must be weighed when considering MDL-specific rules. Many judges already
take precautions to limit bias from “ad hoc” MDL procedure. Precautions
include “put[ting] . . . MDL procedures on the record, creat[ing] case
websites, transcrib[ing] all proceedings, and creat[ing] phone connections to
allow lawyers, litigants, and even state court judges to listen to all
proceedings.”138 As a result of these measures, several judges have observed
that “MDLs [are] more visible to the stakeholders in any particular MDL
than in non-MDL proceedings.”139
Additionally, most of the proposals for amended rules focus on the “megaMDLs” that aggregate tens of thousands of cases, and the Subcommittee has
elected to focus on this subset of proceedings.140 If the new MDL rules are to
be transsubstantive, like the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, this narrow
focus could create problems. As the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules
noted, “[i]f one thinks about rules of general application, it may be difficult
to characterize rules that only bear on the two dozen largest MDLs as fitting
readily in that category.”141 If the new rules are not to be transsubstantive,
drafting rules that distinguish smaller MDLs from these “mega-MDLs” may
exacerbate the costs of information gathering, as well as threaten the efficacy
of any rules that are eventually adopted. That the overall number of MDL
proceedings has been consistently declining in the last decade further
suggests that MDL-specific rules may be of limited utility.
David Noll argues that the push for MDL rules may be “misguided”
because MDL is fundamentally different from ordinary civil litigation.142
Rather, he views MDL as a form of public administration that should be
subject to the same protections that have operated for decades to keep
administrative agencies in check.143 He points out that, by delegating
authority to the Panel and to the transferee judge in § 1407, Congress suggests
that “the procedures appropriate to resolve, say, the opioid litigation cannot
be defined ex ante. If Congress could anticipate the necessary procedures, it
could enact them itself.”144

Id. at 1689.
Id.
OCTOBER 2019 MEETING, supra note 20, at 102-03.
APRIL 2019 MEETING, supra note 54, at 207.
David L. Noll, MDL as Public Administration, 118 MICH. L. REV. 403, 455 (2019).
See id. at 454 (“Because it evolved in parallel with modern administrative law, MDL lacks
guarantees of transparency, participation, and ex post review applicable to administrative
agencies.”).
144 Id. at 455.
138
139
140
141
142
143
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III. MDL RULE PROPOSALS
At its October 2019 meeting, the MDL Subcommittee identified four topics
as “the center of current work” on MDL rulemaking: (1) early vetting, (2)
opportunities for interlocutory appellate review, (3) settlement review, and (4)
third-party litigation funding disclosure.145 The Subcommittee has continued
to explore these four subjects in its subsequent meetings, although it has
narrowed its focus to the first three.146 This Part examines the appropriateness
of these topics for rulemaking, not just for their individual merit but also to
examine the appropriateness of the rulemaking enterprise as a whole. The
purpose of this Part is not to provide a comprehensive history of all rule
proposals the Subcommittee has considered and is likely to consider. Rather,
this Part uses these four topics to offer more specific critiques of MDL-specific
rules. The challenges presented by each of these topics reflect larger challenges
in MDL rulemaking. Ultimately, this Part argues that an analysis of these four
proposals shows that MDL-specific rules will not promote the two goals of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure—efficiency and fairness—and accordingly the
Rules Committee should decline to take these proposals further.
A. Early Vetting
The purpose of an early vetting rule for individual cases in an MDL is to
weed out meritless claims. There is some agreement that unfounded
individual cases present a problem in MDLs, but less agreement on whether
the solution to that problem is new or amended MDL-specific rules.147
In the absence of any rule, courts currently employ various methods to
develop information about individual claims, including fact sheets, shortform complaints, plaintiff profiles, and censuses. Defendant fact sheets are
also sometimes required. One possible rule revision is to make fact sheets
mandatory for all MDLs, or for a certain subset of MDLs. The use of fact
sheets is authorized by Rule 16(c)(2)(L), which permits courts to “adopt[]
special procedures for managing potentially difficult or protracted actions
that may involve complex issues, multiple parties . . . or unusual proof
problems.”148 Fact sheets are questionnaires that elicit a wide range of
information, including the circumstances of the plaintiffs’ exposures and the
severity of their injuries. Judges use fact sheets to facilitate settlement

OCTOBER 2019 MEETING, supra note 20, at 103-04.
APRIL 2020 MEETING, supra note 21, at 145, 148, 154; OCTOBER 2020 MEETING, supra
note 22, at 151.
147 See id. at 103 (indicating that there is little agreement about the prospect of finding a
solution to meritless individual cases in a court rule).
148 FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c)(2)(L).
145
146

296

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 169: 275

negotiations or to improve claim administration following settlement.149
Recent research conducted by the Federal Judicial Center found that in
proceedings covered by the study, plaintiff fact sheets were used in fifty-seven
percent of MDLs.150 In MDLs with over 1,000 actions, plaintiff fact sheets
were ordered eighty-seven percent of the time.151
In general, plaintiff fact sheets require: (1) health records,152 (2) personal
identifying information,153 and (3) litigation history.154 Many include other
information requirements, such as medical releases or disclosure of thirdparty litigation funding, but none requires expert testimony or sworn
statements.155 Plaintiff fact sheets can help winnow meritless cases by
revealing claims that will be unsupportable because, for example, there is no
documented injury or illness. Fifty-five percent of proceedings involving
plaintiff fact sheets involved motions to dismiss for failure to file substantially
complete information.156 The frequency of dismissal proceedings following
the use of plaintiff fact sheets suggests that, to an extent, the sheets are well
suited for their purpose—eliminating meritless claims. This is because the
plaintiff ’s failure to file a fact sheet, or to file a substantially complete fact
sheet, may reveal a lack of injury, and, accordingly, an inability to provide the
required information.157 A plaintiff who never used a defective product, for
example, may not be willing or able to provide details about when the product
was used.158 As a result, the use of fact sheets can “save defendants time,
149 MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 22.91 (2004). Plaintiff fact sheets are
different than Lone Pine orders, which require production of case-specific, sworn expert evidence of
causation. See, e.g., In re Digitek Prod. Liab. Litig., 264 F.R.D. 249, 255 (S.D. W. Va. 2010) (“A Lone
Pine order is designed to assist in the management of complex issues and potential burdens on
defendants and the court in mass tort litigation, essentially requiring plaintiffs . . . to support their
claims at the outset.”).
150 WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 81, at 1.
151 Id.
152 Health records include information about general health, health issues related to the
product, names of doctors, pharmacies, and denial of health insurance. Id. at 2.
153 Personal identifying information includes names, addresses, education, and employment. Id.
154 Litigation history includes prior tort litigation, past bankruptcy, social security claims, and
workers’ compensation claims. Id.
155 Id.
156 Id. at 4. This dismissal can be ordered pursuant to Rule 41(b) (providing for dismissal for
failure “to prosecute or to comply with . . . a court order”) or Rule 37(b)(2)(A) (providing for
dismissal for failure “to obey an order to provide or permit discovery”). See id.; FED R. CIV. P.
41(b); FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(A).
157 But note that lack of injury is not the only reason a plaintiff may be unable to complete a
fact sheet. In medical device injury cases, “long waiting periods and unclear request processes” can
make it difficult for plaintiffs to gather the information they need from hospitals to fully complete
a fact sheet. Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Nudges and Norms in Multidistrict Litigation: A Response to
Engstrom, 129 YALE L.J.F. 64, 81 (2019). And the requisite information about, for example, a
defective product, will sometimes be in the defendant’s exclusive control.
158 OCTOBER 2019 MEETING, supra note 20, at 105.
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money, and aggravation; conserve scarce judicial resources; expedite the
resolution of claims; deter the filing of groundless suits; and safeguard the
integrity of trial processes.”159
But because plaintiff fact sheets are already used in eighty-seven percent
of large personal injury MDLs, a new rule may be unnecessary.160 And because
fact sheets may delay the resolution of smaller MDLs, a new transsubstantive
rule could prove harmful rather than helpful if it applies across the board.
Many MDL plaintiffs are facing serious, life-threatening injuries, and even a
slight delay could jeopardize their chance at recovery.161 Further, MDL judges
have the knowledge and expertise to quickly eliminate truly frivolous claims,
making the benefit for imposing the delay all the more minimal.
In addition, plaintiff fact sheets are not identical in every case in which
they are used. Different courts and different judges require disclosure of
different information based on the case-specific facts of the proceeding before
them.162 While some judges may only want basic information about the
plaintiffs’ injuries, others want detailed health records, including the names
of all doctors, nurses, and pharmacies consulted by the plaintiffs.163 And for
some MDLs, like the Navarette dog food litigation described in the
Introduction, the “typical” human health-oriented fact sheet would be
completely out of place. Because of this variety, it would be very difficult to
craft a rule detailing the exact information that must be disclosed in all
plaintiff fact sheets.164 Any possible rule would necessarily be vague, and a
vague rule may be of little more use than no rule at all. Beyond just unhelpful,
a vague rule may prove actively harmful: a judge may interpret the rule based
on the particular MDL being decided, setting binding precedent for future
cases that may be factually dissimilar.
Requiring information disclosure through fact sheets also raises concerns
about access to the courts. Forcing plaintiffs to produce evidence showing
that their claims are not meritless may bar access to the courts when the
necessary evidence is not in the plaintiff ’s possession, either because it is
159 See Nora Freeman Engstrom, The Lessons of Lone Pine, 129 YALE L.J. 2, 5 (2019) (discussing
the benefits of Lone Pine orders, many of which also apply to plaintiff fact sheets).
160 OCTOBER 2019 MEETING, supra note 20, at 205 (“Even a modest rule change, such as
including a ‘nudge’ to consider the utility of PFS/DFS treatment in an MDL in Rule 26(f) and Rule
16, may be unnecessary.”).
161 See A DVISORY C OMM . ON C IV . R ULES , J UD . C ONF . OF THE U.S., M EETING
M INUTES OF THE A DVISORY C OMMITTEE ON C IVIL R ULES 22-23 (Apr. 2-3, 2019),
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2019-04_cv_minutes_final_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F9UX-YX42] [hereinafter A PRIL 2019 M EETING M INUTES] (expressing
concern that elderly plaintiffs may die while an appeal is pending).
162 See APRIL 2019 MEETING, supra note 54, at 209 (“[T]hese orders tend to be specific to the
circumstances of the litigation in which they are entered.”).
163 WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 81, at 2.
164 APRIL 2019 MEETING, supra note 54, at 209.
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difficult or costly to obtain or because it is in the control of the defendants.
While requiring only medical records, personal identifying information, and
past litigation history may not present access challenges, other proposed
measures have pressed further.
Consider, for example, the proposed Fairness in Class Action Litigation
Act of 2017.165 Although the bill languished in the Senate, it provides a guide
for what an early vetting rule might look like. The bill would have added a
new subsection (i) to § 1407, providing that
[i]n any coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings . . . counsel for a
plaintiff asserting a claim seeking redress for personal injury whose civil
action is assigned to or directly filed in the proceeding shall make a
submission sufficient to demonstrate that there is evidentiary support (including
but not limited to medical records) for the factual contentions in plaintiff ’s
complaint regarding the alleged injury, the exposure to the risk that allegedly
caused the injury, and the alleged cause of the injury.166

Plaintiffs may well be able to present evidence supporting their injuries and
exposure, but evidence about the alleged cause of injury is often within the
defendant’s exclusive control. In products-liability litigation, for example, the
defendant is usually in a better position to know about the manufacturing
process that produced a defective product, or about clinical trial results for a
defective drug. Placing the burden on plaintiffs to affirmatively produce
evidence that may be outside of their control, often before any discovery has
taken place, closes the courthouse doors to deserving, injured people, or at least
makes it more challenging and time-consuming for them to bring their claims.
But some rulemaking in this area may be appropriate because fact sheets,
and to an even greater extent, Lone Pine orders, as currently employed are
arguably inconsistent with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.167 To bring
these practices more in line with the Civil Rules, amendments may be
necessary. While innovation is at the heart of MDL, MDL judges may not
employ procedures that “stand in tension with—and permit courts to make
end-runs around—certain procedural requirements.”168 Depending on what
the fact sheets entail, they could violate Rule 8(a)(2) by requiring more than a
short and plain statement,169 Rule 11(b)(3) by requiring pleadings to be verified
without an opportunity for further investigation or discovery,170 or Rule 56 by
H.R. 985, 115th Cong. (2017).
Id. § 105 (emphasis added).
For a discussion of how Lone Pine orders may be inconsistent with the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, see Engstrom, supra note 159.
168 Id. at 42.
169 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
170 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(3).
165
166
167
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dismissing claims without appropriate safeguards, like an opportunity for
discovery and a finding that there are no genuine issues of fact.171
Rule 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”172 By requiring plaintiffs to
submit fact sheets with information beyond a statement of the claim, such as
evidence demonstrating exposure and causation, MDL judges in essence
apply a heightened pleading standard—even above the plausibility standard
created by Twombly and Iqbal—without any authority in the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure to do so.173 Further, using fact sheets to verify pleadings is
contrary to Rule 11(b)(3), which requires only that counsel certify that the
allegations “will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable
opportunity for further investigation . . . .”174 Rule 11 is structured this way
because “sometimes a litigant may . . . need discovery . . . to gather and
confirm the evidentiary basis for the allegation.”175 This is equally true in
MDL. And as to Rule 56, a dissenting appellate court judge in California
called a dismissal for failure to comply with a Lone Pine order “a bastardized
process which had the purpose and effect of summary judgment but avoided
the very procedures and protections the Legislature deemed essential.”176 The
Eleventh Circuit has also cautioned that Lone Pine orders “should not be used
as (or become) the platforms for pseudo-summary judgment motions.”177
B. Interlocutory Appellate Review
At the outset, it should be noted that the MDL Subcommittee has
recommended against a new rule providing for expanded interlocutory appellate
review.178 It is possible, however, that the full Advisory Committee will decide to
consider further rulemaking efforts.179 The push for interlocutory appellate
review in MDL precedes the Committee’s decision to consider MDL-specific
rules.180 Proponents of increased appellate review worry that the MDL statute
FED. R. CIV. P. 56.
FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
See generally Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (granting a motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim when the plaintiffs’ allegations merely recited the elements of the cause of
action, and requiring the facts alleged to be plausible); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (same).
174 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(3).
175 FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment.
176 Cottle v. Super. Ct., 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 882, 897 (Ct. App. 1992) (Johnson, J., dissenting).
177 Adinolfe v. United Techs. Corp., 768 F.3d 1161, 1168 (11th Cir. 2014).
178 OCTOBER 2020 MEETING, supra note 22, at 154.
179 See id. at 158 (“In case the full Advisory Committee concludes that further efforts are
justified regarding interlocutory review . . . .”).
180 See, e.g., Andrew S. Pollis, The Need for Non-Discretionary Interlocutory Appellate Review in
Multidistrict Litigation, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1643 (2011) (presenting an argument in favor of nondiscretionary interlocutory appellate review in MDL nearly a decade ago).
171
172
173

300

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 169: 275

does not provide for meaningful supervision of district courts.181 They argue that
early appellate review would curb the “excess power” of the presiding MDL
judge and “create a foundation for global settlement based not on the coercion of
a single trial judge’s potentially erroneous view of the law, but instead on carefully
considered legal principles that have been forged in the course of full-scale
appellate review.”182
An early appeal does provide some efficiency gains if a court can detect
mistakes early on, as legal error in pretrial rulings generates effects that
extend “far beyond the mere conduct of litigation.”183 These savings are
amplified by the fact that MDLs often contain thousands of claims; a court’s
resolution of a potentially dispositive question on appeal would save the
judicial system the resources of resolving not just one case but many.
Currently, interlocutory appeal of MDL decisions is available by
permission of the district court using § 1292(b):
When a district judge . . . shall be of the opinion that [an] order involves a
controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for
difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may
materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, he shall so state
in writing in such order. The Court of Appeals . . . may thereupon, in its
discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such order.184

Put another way, under § 1292(b), a district court may “certify” an issue
for appeal if it identifies (1) a controlling question of law with (2) substantial
ground for difference of opinion and (3) an appeal may materially advance
the termination of the litigation.185
Empirical evidence suggests that § 1292(b) is not employed often, and
even when it is employed, appellate review is rarely granted.186 Proponents
of MDL-specific interlocutory appellate review argue that these data show
that in large personal injury MDL proceedings, § 1292(b) does not, in
practice, afford a meaningful opportunity to secure appellate review.187 They
suggest that the “types of appeals envisioned by the proposed rule arise
relatively infrequently in mass tort MDL proceedings, such that the adoption
of [a rule authorizing immediate interlocutory appeal from orders that would

181
182
183
184
185
186
187

Id. at 1646.
Id. at 1648.
Id. at 1667 (citation omitted).
28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).
Id.
Beisner, supra note 83, at 2.
Id.
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be dispositive of a substantial number of claims] would not add substantial
new burdens to our federal courts of appeals.”188
Interlocutory appellate review presents a particularly interesting subject
for MDL rulemaking because there is already a close analogue in the class
action context: Rule 23(f). Rule 23(f) authorizes a court of appeals to “permit
an appeal from an order granting or denying class-action certification,” but it
does not create an appeal as of right.189 The court of appeals is “given
unfettered discretion whether to permit the appeal, akin to the discretion
exercised by the Supreme Court in acting on a petition for certiorari.”190
Unlike § 1292(b), Rule 23(f) does not require that district courts “certify” an
issue for appeal, nor does it limit appeals to “controlling question[s] of law”
with “substantial ground for difference of opinion.”191
The case for a new interlocutory appellate review rule in the MDL
context is harder to make out than in the class action context. There is no
clear MDL analogue to the class certification decision, which is the defining
moment in class action procedure.192 Proponents of a new MDL rule have
suggested allowing immediate appellate review of “preemption rulings,
rulings on the admissibility of expert opinion evidence, and rulings on
personal jurisdiction.”193 Rule 23(f) deals with an order that routinely is
among the most important in a class action. It is not apparent that preemption
rulings, rulings on the admissibility of expert opinion evidence, rulings on
personal jurisdiction, or any one order carries similar weight in an MDL.194
As the Subcommittee points out, “the range of orders that might have such
significance in MDL proceedings makes it difficult to predict with confidence
which might have central importance in a given MDL.”195
In addition to the difficulty of determining which decisions in an MDL
ought to be covered, an immediate appeal rule may also significantly prolong
litigation, undercutting the efficiency gains motivating the use of MDL in the

Id. at 13.
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f).
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f) advisory committee’s note to 1998 amendment. The Committee further
clarified “courts of appeals will develop standards for granting review that reflect the changing areas
of uncertainty in class litigation.” Id. The Committee also added that “[p]ermission to appeal may be
granted or denied on the basis of any consideration that the court of appeals finds persuasive.” Id.
191 Charles R. Flores, Appealing Class Action Certification Decisions Under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(f), 4 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 27, 40 (2007).
192 See, e.g., Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980) (“A district court’s
ruling on the certification issue is often the most significant decision rendered in these class-action
proceedings.”).
193 APRIL 2019 MEETING, supra note 54, at 213.
194 Id. at 212.
195 Id. at 213-14.
188
189
190
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first place.196 One judge at the April 2019 Subcommittee meeting reported
that it can take two years to get an answer from a § 1292 appeal in his district.197
As of 2018, the median time for federal circuit courts to resolve an appeal was
eight and a half months.198 For plaintiffs with serious illnesses and injuries,
this may be too long.199 Immediate review may also delay or defeat settlement
efforts, or upset the balance between well-resourced defendants and plaintiffs
who may be willing to settle for less than they deserve to avoid the hassle and
delay of appeal. It will naturally increase the workload of the appellate courts
and will create satellite procedural litigation concerning the appeals process.200
Finally, an immediate appeal rule may “disproportionately benefit the masstort defendants, who tend to have greater financial resources and will use that
wherewithal to manipulate the litigation process and ‘wear out’ a plaintiff with
inferior economic backing.”201 Because of these costs, the scales of efficiency
and fairness tilt against an MDL-specific interlocutory appeal rule.
C. Settlement Review
Although it has not yet decided whether to recommend a new rule
governing settlement review and, relatedly, the appointment of leadership
counsel, the Subcommittee provided a sketch for such a rule at its October
2020 meeting.202 Most relevant here, the rule sketch requires that any
settlement terms agreed to by lead counsel “(1) must be fair, reasonable, and
adequate; (2) must treat all similarly situated plaintiffs equally; and (3) may
require acceptance by a stated fraction of all plaintiffs, but may not require
acceptance by a stated fraction of all plaintiffs represented by a single
lawyer.”203 It is helpful to keep this language in mind when considering the
appropriateness of an MDL settlement rule.
One of the benefits of centralizing litigation through MDL is that
collecting claims can promote settlement.204 Settlement often benefits both
parties, as well as the judicial system. It helps plaintiffs who have been harmed
196 See, e.g., Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 106 (2009) (“Permitting
piecemeal, prejudgment appeals, we have recognized, undermines ‘efficient judicial administration’
and encroaches upon the prerogatives of district court judges, who play a ‘special role’ in managing
ongoing litigation.”).
197 APRIL 2019 MEETING MINUTES, supra note 161, at 21.
198 Noll, supra note 142, at 463.
199 APRIL 2019 MEETING MINUTES, supra note 161, at 22 (pointing out that, in medical device
cases, “[m]any plaintiffs are elderly” and “[s]ome will die while the appeal is pending.”).
200 Pollis, supra note 180, at 1690.
201 Id. at 1691-92 (footnote omitted).
202 OCTOBER 2020 MEETING, supra note 22, at 171-73.
203 Id. at 173 (footnote omitted).
204 Deborah R. Hensler, The Role of Multi-Districting in Mass Tort Litigation: An Empirical
Investigation, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 883, 906 (2001).
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recover compensation for their injuries, and it helps defendants achieve global
peace.205 Settlement may also produce more equitable outcomes in large
products-liability cases not eligible for class certification, in which there is a
risk that trying cases individually will deplete the recovery available to future
injured plaintiffs.206 And for the judiciary, “[t]he exercise of broad settlement
authority is arguably a matter of self-preservation for the federal court
system: if meritorious claims do not settle, the system lacks the capacity to
try all of the federally filed claims individually.”207
But settlement in the MDL context is also controversial. Critics of MDL
settlements have argued that the law does not authorize this use of MDLs,
and that this use does not fit within the purposes § 1407.208 Others argue that
the use of settlement in MDLs is “purposefully employed to avoid the
safeguards that federal courts . . . erected to protect the rights of
claimants.”209 The MDL Subcommittee is especially concerned that
“plaintiffs represented by lawyers who do not participate in the centralized
steering committee structure are not afforded a genuine opportunity for
meaningful individual settlement negotiations.”210 This fear is particularly
salient with inventory settlements. In an inventory settlement, the defendant
agrees to pay the lawyers representing many plaintiffs and many cases a lump
sum to settle all of the lawyers’ cases.211 This is problematic for many reasons.
For one, it can create a “race-to-the-bottom” in which the defendant agrees to
settle with the first lawyer to accept their proposal (potentially reducing or
eliminating the recovery available for other injured plaintiffs). In addition,
plaintiffs who are more seriously injured may be disadvantageously lumped

205 See Christopher B. Mueller, Taking a Second Look at MDL Product Liability Settlements:
Somebody Needs to Do It, 65 U. KAN. L. REV. 531, 540 (2017) (“[D]efendants are willing to pay a
premium—actually more to settle ‘the whole batch’ of cases brought against them than they would
pay for all the individual claims if they settled one by one—for a ‘global’ MDL settlement (one that
covers essentially all potential claimants).”); see also Samuel Issacharoff & D. Theodore Rave, The
BP Oil Spill Settlement and the Paradox of Public Litigation, 74 LA. L. REV. 397, 413-14 (2014)
(describing defendants’ willingness to pay a significant amount to resolve mass litigation).
206 See generally Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997) (discussing the recovery
risks of asbestos litigation that is not eligible for class-action certification).
207 Margaret S. Thomas, Morphing Case Boundaries in Multidistrict Litigation Settlements, 63
EMORY L.J. 1339, 1377 (2014).
208 Mueller, supra note 205, at 531; see also Richard L. Marcus, Cure-All for an Era of Dispersed
Litigation? Toward a Maximalist Use of the Multidistrict Litigation Panel’s Transfer Power, 82 TUL. L.
REV. 2245, 2289 (2008) (“[T]here is at least some reason for institutional uneasiness about more
aggressive use of MDL procedures to maximize the judicial system’s ability to achieve the most
comprehensive settlements.”).
209 Mueller, supra note 205, at 531.
210 OCTOBER 2019 MEETING, supra note 20, at 104.
211 APRIL 2019 MEETING, supra note 54, at 217.
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together with plaintiffs suffering minimal injuries, reducing their bargaining
power during settlement negotiations.212
Like interlocutory appellate review, settlement review for MDL has a
class action counterpart: Rule 23(e). Rule 23(e) was significantly amended in
December 2018. Relevant here, the amended Rule 23 requires courts to
consider four factors when deciding whether a settlement is adequate:
(i) [T]he costs, risks, and delay of trial and appeal; (ii) the effectiveness of
any proposed method of distributing relief to the class, including the method
of processing class-member claims; (iii) the terms of any proposed award of
attorney’s fees, including timing of payment; and (iv) any agreement required
to be identified under Rule 23(e)(3).213

MDL is not subject to the formal constraints of Rule 23(e). It does not
require class certification, or a hearing, or equitable treatment of plaintiffs
relative to each other.214 Rule 23 “sets limits, establishes criteria, and
authorizes a degree of judicial supervision and control that is very much out
of the ordinary,” while MDL centralization “operates free of those limits,
ignores those criteria, and employs the same extraordinary judicial power.”215
Some scholars and judges have likened settlement in the MDL context to
a “quasi-class action,” implying that the same protections at play in Rule 23(e)
should apply.216 There may be good reason, however, for treating settlement
differently under the class action device than under the MDL device. Unlike
class actions, MDL involves individual lawsuits with separate claimants.217 As
a result, several courts—both federal and state—often have power over the
plaintiffs, and “there may be no single court that is well positioned to facilitate
and administer [a] global settlement.”218 This presents a problem for adopting
a rule similar to Rule 23(e): which court will assess the fairness and adequacy
212
213
214
215

For a spirited critique of MDL product-liability settlements, see generally Mueller, supra note 205.
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2)(C)(i-iv).
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e) (imposing these requirements).
Mueller, supra note 205, at 542-43. Linda Mullenix also noted that
[i]n the past three decades, federal courts—including the Supreme Court—have
rejected collusive backroom aggregate settlement deals that do not adequately
protect the interests of class members. In response, and in order to be free of formal
class action constraints, self-interested actors on both sides of the docket have coopted the [MDL] to provide a staging-ground for the private resolution of aggregate
claims.

Mullenix, supra note 58, at 390.
See Mullenix, supra note 58, at 389-91 (identifying sixty-eight federal cases citing the term
“quasi-class action”); Charles Silver & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Quasi-Class Action Method of Managing
Multi-District Litigations: Problems and a Proposal, 63 VAND. L. REV. 107, 113-143 (2010) (describing
the “Quasi-Class Action Model of MDL Management”).
217 Thomas, supra note 207, at 1347.
218 Id.
216
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of the settlement, if no single court has power over all the settling parties?219
To overcome this hurdle, some settlement agreements have included
provisions appointing the MDL transferee judge to preside over the
settlement, requiring the settling parties to consent to that judge’s authority.220
But this strategy does not work if a party refuses to consent, nor is it clear that
the drafters of the MDL statute intended to grant such a power. Settlement is
much different than the pretrial procedures contemplated in § 1407.
D. Third-Party Litigation Funding
Third-party litigation funding is becoming increasingly common, and it
involves increasingly large amounts of money.221 It entails investments in
litigation by nonparties, often hedge funds, in exchange for a percentage of
any settlement or judgment entered.222 The typical funding arrangement has
been described as one in which
a specialist funding company or a hedge fund . . . pay[s] the lawyers’ fees on
an interim basis. . . . If you win, you pay a contingency fee out of the damages,
usually expressed as a percentage of the damages up to an agreed cap. A typical
contingency fee would be between twenty and fifty percent of the damages,
with a cap of three to four times the legal costs advanced by the funder.223

There are two types of third-party litigation funding: consumer funding
and commercial funding.224 Consumer funding usually involves individual

Id.
Settlement Agreement Between Merck & Co., Inc. and the Counsel Listed on the
Signature Pages Hereto at 1, In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1657 (E.D. La. Nov. 9, 2007),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/64978/000095012307015538/y42609exv10w1.htm
[https://perma.cc/W94D-VGE8].
221 See Maya Steinitz, Whose Claim Is This Anyway? Third-Party Litigation Funding, 95 MINN L.
REV. 1268, 1270-71 (2011) (“Litigation funding, still in its infancy but steadily growing, is one of the
most significant developments in civil litigation today.”); Tripp Haston, Pulling Back the Curtain:
Moving Toward Disclosure of Third-Party Funding in Litigation, BRADLEY (July 2018),
https://www.bradley.com/insights/publications/2018/07/pulling-back-the-curtain-moving-towarddisclosure-of-third-party-funding-in-litigation [https://perma.cc/P7JW-4676](“[T]he use of thirdparty litigation funding (TPLF) is growing at an exponential rate.”); Holly Urban, Insight: Law
Firms, Clients Should Heed the Tech World, Consider Crowdfunding, BLOOMBERG L. (Jan. 7, 2019, 1:00
AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/insight-law-firms-clients-should-heed-the-techworld-consider-crowdfunding [https://perma.cc/GEH3-HC8D] (“Crowdfunding as a means of
litigation funding, or to pay for otherwise expensive legal work, should be understood in much the
same way as traditional forms of funding.”).
222 Third Party Litigation Funding (TPLF), U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM,
https://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/issues/third-party-litigation-funding [https://perma.cc/K7VKWJ75].
223 Steinitz, supra note 221, at 1276 (citation omitted).
224 JAYME HERSCHKOPF, FED. JUD. CTR., THIRD-PARTY LITIG. FIN. 3 (2017).
219
220
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plaintiffs, as in personal injury or divorce actions.225 It may cover things like
living expenses for plaintiffs waiting for resolution of their cases and usually
does not involve much money.226 Commercial funding is more often used for
business-to-business disputes, class actions, and mass tort litigation.227 This
form of litigation funding often involves significant sums of money—
potentially millions of dollars.228
Currently there are no federal rules requiring disclosure of third-party
litigation funding in any context. But proposals have been made to amend the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to include disclosure of third-party funding
as part of the Rule 26 required disclosures, even outside of the MDL
context.229 Third-party litigation funding can be relevant to the court for many
reasons: there may be financial conflicts of interest between the judge and the
funder, or a judge may need to resolve allegations of financing abuses.230
While the funded party is usually the plaintiff, both plaintiffs and defendants
can benefit from third-party litigation funding.231 Plaintiffs can litigate cases that
they otherwise could not afford to bring, and they can receive financial support
for housing and other obligations while their cases are ongoing.232 Likewise,
defendants can shift the costs of litigation to a third-party more able to bear them
and can hedge risks that they are unwilling or unable to take.233
While third-party litigation funding can help plaintiffs afford to bring
their cases and allow defendants to hedge some of the risks of litigation, it
also has its costs. Some courts and commentators worry that such funding
will lead to increased settlement failures and interference in the attorneyclient relationship.234 Concerns about third-party litigation funding are not
new. Champerty, defined as an “agreement to divide litigation proceeds
between the owner of the litigated claim and a party unrelated to the lawsuit
who supports or helps enforce the claim,” has been restricted since the
nineteenth century.235 Opponents of third-party financing argue that, like
champerty, it encourages excessive, unnecessary, or speculative litigation,
Id.
APRIL 2019 MEETING, supra note 54, at 220.
HERSCHKOPF, supra note 224, at 3.
APRIL 2019 MEETING, supra note 54, at 220.
HERSCHKOPF, supra note 224224, at 9; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 26.
HERSCHKOPF, supra note 224, at 9.
See, e.g., Steinitz, supra note 221, at 1278 (“[W]hile attorney funding and third-party
funding of individual and class claims are not unprecedented, funding of corporate
defendants . . . is a new phenomenon.”)
232 Id. at 1276.
233 Id.
234 Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, The Effect of Third-Party Funding of Plaintiffs
on Settlement, 104 AM. ECON. REV. 2552, 2552 (2014).
235 Champerty, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019); see also Steinitz, supra note 221, at
1287 (discussing the historical origins of the doctrine of champerty).
225
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spurred by the desire of third parties to make a profit rather than the desire
of injured plaintiffs for redress.236
As of 2019, twenty-four districts and six circuits have local rules “that
seem to point toward disclosure of third-party funding.”237 But third-party
litigation funding is not limited to MDL proceedings—in fact, it does not
appear to play a distinctive or noteworthy role in MDL proceedings as
compared to other forms of litigation.238 Because third-party litigation
funding is not MDL-specific, an MDL-specific rule will not address all of
the concerns expressed by proponents of disclosure. Additionally, because the
use of third-party litigation funding is growing rapidly, and because most
transferee judges have not reported being aware of its use in the MDL
litigation before them, it seems that the most appropriate vehicle for further
study of a disclosure rule is not the MDL.239
IV. ALTERNATIVES TO RULEMAKING
When deciding whether to promulgate new federal rules, it is important to
also consider the alternatives to federal rulemaking. In the MDL context,
advocates of change have several alternatives: Congress could pass a new
statute;240 the Rules Committee could amend the existing rules;241 the Rules
Committee could appoint a Working Group; the Panel could issue additional
guidance to litigants and their attorneys;242 or the Manual for Complex Litigation
and similar resources could provide more education on MDL proceedings.243 Like
new rules, these mechanisms for procedural change come with their own costs, but
they may nevertheless be better suited for the MDL context.
A. Action by Congress
In 2017, the House introduced the Fairness in Class Action Litigation Act,
backed exclusively by Republicans, which would have significantly reformed
Steinitz, supra note 221, at 1287.
OCTOBER 2019 MEETING, supra note 20, at 112.
See id. at 111.
See id. at 191 (“For purposes of this Subcommittee . . . the most salient point is that it has
not heard that TPLF plays a substantial role in MDL proceedings. . . . Under these circumstances,
the Subcommittee has concluded that rule amendments keyed to MDL litigation would not be
justified.”); APRIL 2020 MEETING, supra note 21, at 145 (“[I]ssues regarding third-party litigation
funding (TPLF) did not seem particularly pronounced in relation to MDL proceedings. To the
contrary, this sort of activity seems at least equally important in a broad range of types of litigation.”).
240 See Section IV.A.
241 See, e.g., LAWS. FOR CIV. JUST., supra note 122, at 2 (arguing that amending Rule 26 would
reduce the number of meritless claims filed).
242 Current guidance for MDL litigants and their attorneys can be found on the Panel website,
https://www.jpml.uscourts.gov [https://perma.cc/J74B-H35W].
243 MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) (2004).
236
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MDL procedure.244 Although the bill passed the House on party lines, it did
not make it through the Senate. Many of the bill’s provisions are similar or
identical to proposals submitted to the MDL Subcommittee.245 If passed, the
bill would have included “(1) a requirement of evidentiary verification of
allegations within forty-five days of filing or transfer,” akin to an early vetting
rule; “(2) a bar on bellwether trials without consent; (3) enhanced
interlocutory review of most orders issued by the MDL judge; and (4) a
requirement that personal-injury plaintiffs receive ‘not less than 80 percent
of any monetary recovery.’”246 The House Judiciary Committee explained the
purposes of these provisions: “[MDL] proceedings, often largely consisting
of claims that should never have been filed, impose unfair burdens on courts
and defendants and prevent plaintiffs with trial-worthy claims from timely
getting their day in court.”247
But procedural change through Congress has its limits. It takes time, and
often reflects party ideologies.248 As the history of § 1407 suggests, getting
statutes passed in Congress often requires significant strategic planning and
maneuvering.249 Additionally, Congress may lack the MDL-specific expertise
needed to draft rules that account for the nuances of MDL proceedings; the
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation has worked closely with the Rules
Committee in considering new rules, but it may be unable or unwilling to
assist Congress in the same capacity. Because of these limitations,
congressional action may not be an effective mechanism for MDL reform.
B. Working Groups
Another alternative to new MDL rules is to set up an MDL Working
Group. A Working Group could review the problems identified by
proponents of new MDL rules and determine whether further action is
necessary. A Working Group has some advantages over the current work
being done by the Subcommittee: it could be given a finite period of time to
conduct research, ensuring that the concerns of both proponents and
opponents of new rules are timely addressed, and provide a formal report
addressing the Group’s findings.

244
245
246
247
248
249

H.R. 985, 115th Cong. (2017); Bradt, supra note 98, at 89.
Bradt, supra note 98, at 89.
Id. at 97.
H.R. REP. NO. 115-25, at 3 (2017).
Bradt, supra note 98, at 89.
Id. at 92-97.
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Such a strategy was employed in 1999 with the creation of the ad hoc
Judicial Conference Working Group on Mass Torts.250 The Mass Torts Working
Group met four times “to identify and catalog” the most significant and
pressing problems created by the increase in mass tort litigation and “to
consider the full range of potential solutions,” including “legislation, rules, case
management, revised practices, or education.”251 The Group determined that
the best solution involved “a combination of legislation, rules, and case
management.”252 A similar strategy might work well for MDL, as there is
significant overlap between many large MDL proceedings and mass torts. At
the very least, the creation of an MDL Working Group would provide an outlet
for scholars and litigants to voice their concerns about ad hoc MDL procedure.
C. Amending Current Rules
Instead of creating new MDL-specific rules, the Rules Committee could
amend the current rules to include special provisions for MDLs. This was
done in 2006, when the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were amended to
account for changes in litigation brought about by new technology.253 The
amendments “were intended to clarify the discovery rights and obligations of
the parties in cases with electronic discovery and, in so doing, provide
guidance to litigants, lawyers, and judges.”254
But amending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure presents many of the
same challenges as promulgating new rules. The e-discovery rule amendments
were the product of over five years of work, and MDL amendments would
likely require a similar—if not greater—time commitment.255 Additionally, rule
amendments do not resolve the efficiency problems presented by new rules: if
the purpose of the MDL statute is to allow judges to flexibly resolve complex
litigation, even rule amendments threaten to stifle the ability of MDL judges
to craft creative solutions to novel problems.

250 ADVISORY COMM. ON CIV. RULES, JUD. CONF. OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE ADVISORY
COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES AND THE WORKING GROUP ON MASS TORTS TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE
OF THE UNITED STATES AND TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 4 (1999),
https://judicialstudies.duke.edu/sites/default/files/centers/judicialstudies/
mass_tort_litigation_report_1999.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z7TX-JKHG].
251 Id. at 1-3.
252 Id. at 6-7.
253 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 16, 26(a), 26(b), 26(f) 33, 34, 37(f) (laying out guidelines for the
use of technology in trial preparation).
254 Emery G. Lee III, Effectiveness of the 2006 Rules Amendments, 11 SEDONA CONF. J. 191, 194 (2010).
255 Thomas Y. Allman, The Impact of the Proposed Federal E-Discovery Rules, 12 RICH. J.L. &
TECH. 1, 2-4 (2006).
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D. Education
The Rules Committee could also recommend increasing the amount of
educational resources available about MDL proceedings and best practices,
aimed at both transferee judges and MDL lawyers. It could push for
modifications to the Manual for Complex Litigation, as it suggested at its
April 2020 meeting,256 or recommend that the Panel offer more guidance on
managing MDLs. The Manual for Complex Litigation already contains
extensive directives about settlement review in the MDL context—including
information on coordination in multiparty litigation, organizational
structures, powers and responsibilities, and compensation.257 The Manual
could add similar provisions on the use of fact sheets and census techniques,
perhaps using research by the Federal Judicial Center as a guide.258 Because
the Panel has been working closely with the Rules Committee since it first
began considering MDL rule proposals, it is likely that the Panel would be
receptive to any recommendations that the Subcommittee finds will improve
MDL procedure. The Panel already has an “active approach to educating
MDL judges” and an updated website, and it seems probable that the Panel
would be amendable to providing additional guidance if requested.259 Using
these channels, the Panel could raise awareness, for example, about the use of
plaintiff fact sheets to encourage more MDL judges to employ them to screen
for meritless claims. It could also provide sample fact sheets and other
resources to further support MDL judges through the litigation process.260
Alternatively, the Subcommittee could recommend that standards be
established to promote transparency and uniformity in MDL proceedings.261
There is already “broad agreement on the general standards that should
govern large-scale aggregations,” set out, for example, in the American Law
Institute’s Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation.262 The
APRIL 2020 MEETING, supra note 21, at 161.
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § § 10.22, 10.221, 10.222, 10.223 (2004).
See, e.g., WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 81; TEN STEPS TO BETTER CASE MANAGEMENT,
supra note 15.
259 OCTOBER 2019 MEETING, supra note 20, at 103.
260 For an example of a plaintiff fact sheet, see Plaintiff’s Fact Sheet, In re Benicar (Olmesartan) Prods.
Liab. Litig., MDL 2606, (D.N.J.), https://www.njd.uscourts.gov/sites/njd/files/PlaintiffFactSheet.pdf
[https://perma.cc/32EG-8YH2]; see also Burch, supra note 157, at 78-83 (discussing the use of plaintiff
fact sheets more generally); BOLCH JUD. INST., DUKE L. SCH., GUIDELINES AND BEST
PRACTICES FOR LARGE AND MASS-TORT MDLS 10-14 (2d ed. 2018),
https://judicialstudies.duke.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/MDL-2nd-Edition-2018-ForPosting.pdf [https://perma.cc/5WEQ-5GQF] (explaining best practices for fact sheet use).
261 Noll, supra note 142, at 456-57.
262 Id. at 457. The ALI instructs that aggregate proceedings ought to: “(a) enforc[e] substantive
rights and responsibilities; (b) promot[e] the efficient use of litigation resources; (c) facilitat[e]
binding resolutions of civil disputes; and (d) facilitat[e] accurate and just resolutions of civil disputes
by trial and settlement.” PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 1.03 (A.L.I.
256
257
258
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Subcommittee could seek to formally codify these standards, or at the very
least to publish them on the Panel’s website and to update the standards as
MDL continues to evolve.
Focusing on education rather than new rules preserves the flexibility that
transferee judges need to handle novel procedural challenges. It also allows
judges to treat different MDLs differently and give heightened scrutiny to
mega-MDLs when necessary. In terms of fairness, education reform can draw
attention to meritless claims in mega-MDLs and offer specific guidance for
dealing with them. The Panel or Manual could identify criteria for MDL
judges to consider when deciding whether to certify an issue for appeal under
§ 1292(b) or criteria for approving settlements, addressing concerns about the
need for appellate and settlement review.
CONCLUSION
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have two purposes: to make
litigation more efficient, and to make litigation fairer. The corporate defense
bar seeks to create new federal rules specifically for MDL proceedings, but
not to advance either of these purposes.
A Subcommittee of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules is currently
deciding whether to undertake a more serious examination of creating new
MDL-specific rules, and it should decline to take the enterprise any further.
While some proposals have more merit than others, MDL-specific rules
cannot be squared with either the purposes of § 1407 or the twin aims of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure—efficiency and fairness. The judges and
scholar behind the creation of § 1407 wanted to grant federal judges flexibility
to develop creative solutions to novel procedural problems. They carefully
crafted § 1407 to preserve this flexibility. In the fifty years since § 1407 was
passed, litigation has only become more complex, and the need to preserve
this flexibility is more acute than ever.

2010); see also Sullivan v. DB Invs., Inc., 667 F.3d 273, 340 (3d Cir. 2011) (Scirica, J., concurring)
(“Among the goals are redress of injuries, procedural due process, efficiency, horizontal equity among
injured claimants, and finality.”).
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